

[ITEMPO 7757306 00606097 FRP HANSEN]

15/32/

SECRET

FRP: .2, .4, .6, .8

STATE

ACTION: NONE INFO: CMASS-E (), NIO/CN, NIO/NOA, ODPH-H,
 UDPN-N, UDPN-U, OEA/CE/M, OEA/NA/J, OEA/NOA-2, OEA/PO, OEA/SE/MIL,
 OGI/E/ED, OGI/EC/IF, OGI/FC/IT, OGI/I/PI, OGI/R/AT, ONESA/MIL, OOE/EE/R,
 OOE/EEPO-3, OOE/ET/E, OOE/WE, OSA/CS/CA, OSA/CS/CF, OSA/CS/EN, OSA/CS/EP,
 OSA/CS/SD, OSA/CS/X, OSA/EA/G, OSA/PA, OSA/PA/D, OSA/PA/F, OSA/PA/S,
 OSA/SE/I, OSA/SF/M, OSWR/TTC, PLANFAC-E (), POLE-E (), FILE, RF,
 EA-6, OPA/II, SF-3, CRFS/ARO, D/OCR-3, NICAG/EA, NICAG/NWE, NICAG/PM,
 NIO/USSR, OER-3, OIA/EREB, OIA/LFMEA, OSR/MEE, (26/W)

82 7757306

SSO

PAGE 001

NC 7757306

TOR: 060502Z JAN 82

00 RUEAIIB

ZNY SSSSS ZOC STATE ZZH

STU6146

00 RUEHC

DE RUEHKO #0097/01 0060330

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 060325Z JAN 82

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6806

INFO RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0739

RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4700

RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2829

RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 0529

RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0482

RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0417

RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 1244

RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7193

RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0349

RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 1173

RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 1430

RUDKEBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN 1162

RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 6384

RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8219

RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0836

RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 5171

RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 0892

BT

SECRET TOKYO 00097 COMBINED SECTION

SECRET

State Dept. review completed

SECRET

STATE

82 7757306 SSN

PAGE 002

NC 7757306

TOR: 060502Z JAN 82

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 1/5/88 (CLARK, WILLIAM) OR-M

TAGS: PERP, PL, UR, US, XT

SUBJECT: POLAND -- UPDATING MEASURES (JAPAN)

REF: A. STATE 218, B. 81 TOKYO 23040, C. 81 TOKYO 23251

1. S- ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOLLOWING IS FMBASSY'S STATUS REPORT ON GOJ POSITIONS/EFFORTS VIS-A-VIS POLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION AS OF JANUARY 5.

3. PUBLIC POSTURE

-- JAPAN'S PUBLIC POSTURE ON POLAND IS BASICALLY TO ACT TOGETHER WITH THE US AND EUROPE, BUT TO PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE EC. THE GOJ POSITION WAS MOST RECENTLY ARTICULATED ON JAN. 5 WHEN THE CABINET ENDORSED FOREIGN MINISTER SAKURAUCHI'S STATEMENT THAT JAPAN WOULD BASICALLY FALL INTO LINE WITH THE EC POSITION AS SET FORTH IN THE JAN. 4 EC FOREIGN MINISTERS' COMMUNIQUE.

-- ON THE QUESTION OF SOVIET COMPLICITY IN THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND, AT THE JAN. 5 CABINET MEETING FOREIGN MINISTER SAKURAUCHI SAID THAT "WHILE WE CANNOT SAY, WITH CLEAR-CUT EVIDENCE, THAT THE SOVIET UNION INTERVENED IN POLAND, JUDGING FROM PERIPHERAL EVIDENCE, WE THINK THAT THERE HAS BEEN INDIRECT INTERVENTION, AND OUR POSITION AGREES WITH THAT OF THE EC ON THIS POINT."

-- GOJ STATEMENTS HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED REGRET FOR THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW AND URGED THAT THE POLES BE ALLOWED TO SOLVE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERVENTION.

4. INTERNAL DIVERGENCES

-- THE MEDIA AND OTHER JAPANESE OPINION LEADERS, SUCH AS THE HEADS OF LABOR UNIONS, HAVE JOINED THE GOJ IN CONDEMNING THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND. UNLIKE THE GOJ, HOWEVER, SOME OPPOSITION PARTIES AND NEWSPAPERS HAVE BEEN HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE US STAND, CITING PARTICULARLY ITS "UNILATERAL ACTION" WITHOUT

SECRET

SECRET

STATE

82 7757306

SSO

PAGE 003

NC 7757306

TOR: 060502Z JAN 82

CONSULTING ITS ALLIES. FOLLOWING THEIR INITIAL STATEMENTS CRITICIZING THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND, OPPOSITION PARTY SPOKESMEN HAVE GENERALLY MAINTAINED A LOW PUBLIC PROFILE ON THE ISSUE, AND OPPOSITION PARTY CRITICISM OF GOJ POLICY ON POLAND IN THE DIET (WHICH RECESSED ON DECEMBER 22 AND WILL NOT RECONVENE UNTIL AROUND JANUARY 25) CONSISTED MOSTLY OF REQUESTS THAT THE GOJ INCREASE ITS AID TO POLAND.

-- LABOR UNION LEADERS HAVE BEEN THE MOST OUTSPOKEN JAPANESE CRITICS OF THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND. WALESA CAPTURED THE IMAGINATION AND SYMPATHY OF THE JAPANESE LABOR WORLD WHEN HE VISITED JAPAN IN MAY 1981 AT THE INVITATION OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS (SOHYO), JAPAN'S LARGEST TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION AND THE MAJOR SUPPORT ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY. SOHYO HAS RECENTLY INAUGURATED ITS THIRD CAMPAIGN TO RAISE FUNDS AND MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR SOLIDARITY, AND SEIGEN MITSUO TOMIZUKA TRAVELED TO PARIS IN LATE DECEMBER TO MEET WITH FRENCH AND ITALIAN UNION OFFICIALS IN ORDER TO COORDINATE THEIR CAMPAIGNS (REF C). THE JAPAN CONFEDERATION OF LABOR (DOMEI), JAPAN'S SECOND LARGEST TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, HAS INAUGURATED ITS OWN CAMPAIGN OF SUPPORT FOR SOLIDARITY IN COORDINATION WITH THE ICFTU, OF WHICH EXDIS

IT IS A MEMBER. NONE OF JAPAN'S LABOR ORGANIZATIONS FAVORS STOPPING AID TO POLAND, AND NONE HAS CALLED FOR MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION.

5. GOJ ATTITUDE ON SANCTIONS

-- THE GOJ WILL CONTINUE ITS LIMITED ASSISTANCE TO POLAND, WHICH CONSISTS OF A \$30 MILLION CREDIT LINE AND THE REMAINDER OF THE 20,000 METRIC TONS OF DEFERRED PAYMENT RICE TO WHICH JAPAN HAS COMMITTED ITSELF. DECISIONS ON NEW ASSISTANCE, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF THE 1982 DEBT RESCHEDULING WILL BE MADE "CAUTIOUSLY," TAKING INTO PARTICULAR CONSIDERATION THE POSITION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES. (NOTE: JAPAN HAS NO AIR OR FISHERIES AGREEMENT WITH POLAND

SECRET

SECRET

STATE

82 7757306

SSO

PAGE 004

NC 7757306

TOR: 060502Z JAN 82

AND TRADE HAS VIRTUALLY CEASED.)

-- WITH RESPECT TO SANCTIONS AGAINST THE USSR, THE GOJ HAS TAKEN A VERY CAUTIOUS APPROACH AND HAS SIGNALLED THAT IT WILL WAIT FOR THE POSITION OF KEY WESTERN EUROPE STATES TO EMERGE BEFORE IT MAKES ANY DECISIONS. WITHIN MOFA, THERE IS NO CONSENSUS ON WHAT ACTION THE GOJ SHOULD TAKE. SOME MOFA OFFICIALS ARE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE US DECISION ON SOVIET SANCTIONS BECAUSE THEY DO NOT SEE IT AS CONTRIBUTING TO SETTLING THE POLISH PROBLEM. THEY ALSO FEAR IT WILL CAUSE A SERIOUS DETERIORATION IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND AFFECT THE PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL. OTHER MOFA OFFICIALS ARGUE THAT THE GOJ SHOULD PLACE GREATEST EMPHASIS ON SUPPORTING THE US POSITION. THE EUROPEANS HAVE PROVIDED FOR NOW A WAY OUT OF THIS DILEMMA BY PERMITTING THE JAPANESE TO EMBRACE THE EC COMMUNIQUE.

-- AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN GOJ THINKING ON SANCTIONS IS ITS BELIEF THAT IN THE AFGHAN CASE JAPAN MOVED QUICKLY TO SUPPORT THE US AND ADHERED STRICTLY TO ITS SANCTION POLICY, ONLY TO SEE THE WESTERN EUROPEANS TAKE BELATED AND HALFHEARTED ACTION AND IN FACT TAKE BUSINESS AWAY FROM JAPAN. THERE IS STRONG PRESSURE IN JAPAN NOT TO LET THIS HAPPEN AGAIN.

-- THE GOJ RECOGNIZES, HOWEVER, THAT IT MUST, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, GIVE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO US-JAPAN RELATIONS AND WESTERN UNITY AND THAT JAPAN WILL HAVE TO TAKE ACTIONS PARALLEL TO THOSE AGREED UPON BY NATO MEMBERS.

6. POSSIBLE GOJ ACTIONS

-- IF THE EC AND/OR NATO AGREE ON CONSENSUS ACTION, WHICH GOES BEYOND WHAT IS IN THE EC COMMUNIQUE, THE GOJ WILL PROBABLY FOLLOW SUIT. IF THERE IS A SPLIT AMONG KEY EUROPEAN STATES, THERE WILL BE STRONG PRESSURE IN THE GOJ AND THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY FOR JAPAN TO FOLLOW THE "SOFTER" COURSE. NEVERTHELESS, MOFA TOLD US THAT JAPAN IS WILLING TO CONSIDER TIGHTENING COCOM RESTRICTIONS ON HIGH-TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS TO POLAND AND THE USSR. (HOWEVER, GOJ HAS NOT YET MADE A DECISION ON OUR "NO-EXCEPTIONS" REQUEST. WHILE THEY RECOGNIZE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND

SECRET

SECRET

STATE

82 7757306

SSO

PAGE 005

NC 7757306

TOR: 060502Z JAN 82

WESTERN UNITY ASPECTS OF A POSITIVE GOJ DECISION, THEY DO NOT BELIEVE SUCH DECISION IS CRUCIAL. THERE ARE NO JAPANESE EXCEPTIONS CURRENTLY PENDING AND NONE ARE EXPECTED IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.) MOFA IS ALSO STUDYING THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING DEMARCHES TO THE SOVIETS, THE POLES AND OTHER WARSAW PACT STATES BUT WANTS TO SEE WHAT THE EUROPEANS DECIDE IN THIS REGARD.

-- WE HAVE MADE A SPECIFIC REQUEST OF THE GOJ TO

EXDIS

SUSPEND FURTHER EXPORTS OF PIPELAYERS TO THE USSR. THE STATUS OF THIS ISSUE IS REPORTED IN TOKYO 00077 BUT IT APPEARS THAT JAPAN IS SEEKING TO MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THOSE PIPELAYERS ALREADY CONTRACTED FOR AND ABOUT TO BE SHIPPED AND FUTURE CONTRACTS. THE GOJ MAY BE PREPARED TO DEFER FUTURE CONTRACTS BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WILL SUSPEND EXPORT OF PIPELAYERS ALREADY CONTRACTED FOR.

-- IN ADDITION, THE JAPANESE WILL FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT IF WE SEEK TO EXTEND OUR PETROLEUM PRODUCTION, TRANSMISSION AND TECHNOLOGY CONTROLS TO PROJECTS IN SAKHALIN.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT IN OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE JAPANESE POLICY DEVELOPMENT THAT WE CONTINUE TO BRING THE JAPANESE INTO OUR THINKING BEFORE FINAL DECISIONS OR PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS ARE MADE. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE SUGGEST THAT IF SPECIAL ENVOYS ARE DISPATCHED TO EUROPE, CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO INCLUDING JAPAN. IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO HAVE SENIOR USG OFFICIALS VISITING JAPAN ON OTHER BUSINESS BRIEF SENIOR GOJ OFFICIALS ON US POLICY TOWARD POLAND.

(2) AS WE HAVE NOTED, THE GOJ POSITION ON POLAND IN GENERAL AND SANCTIONS IN PARTICULAR IS STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE EC AND

SECRET

SECRET

STATE

82 7757306

SSO

PAGE 006

NC 7757306

TOR: 060502Z JAN 82

NATO MEMBERS. IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR US TO BRIEF THE GOJ REGULARLY ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE POSITION OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS.

(3) WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR A NO-EXCEPTIONS POLICY IN COCOM FOR POLAND AND WE BELIEVE THE JAPANESE WILL GO ALONG. WE SHOULD ALSO PRESS ON CONTROLLING PIPELAYER SALES TO THE SOVIETS WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE JAPANESE ARE UNLIKELY TO BREAK EXISTING CONTRACTS BUT MAY WITHHOLD ON FUTURE SALES.

(4) OUR EFFORTS VIS-A-VIS JAPAN SHOULD BE CAREFULLY FOCUSED ON THE MOST IMPORTANT AND REALISTIC STEPS IT CAN TAKE RATHER THAN "ACROSS THE BOARD PRESSURE." THE GOJ IS MUCH MORE LIKELY TO RESPOND TO EXPRESSIONS OF SUSTAINED US INTEREST IN A FEW SPECIFIC AREAS THAN TO A SHOTGUN APPROACH.

MANSFIELD

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET